Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Actual: in relation to the real world as opposed to a merely possible world or situation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Steven E. Boer on Actuality - Dictionary of Arguments
12 Actuality/Boer: (= existence) against it: being unequals existence. --- Note I 36 Question: Does acquaintance with the object and the property shifts one into another physical state? A) if intentional states are locally supervening on non-intentional facts about the person, then not. B) if they supervise globally, then yes. > "There is". --- I 14 Non-actual essences/non-updated essential properties/Boer: their possibility does not bind us to non-actual individuals whose essences they would be. Plantinga: Thesis: the former make the latter superfluous: Boer pro: that could be. E.g. there is no obligation on a round square, but the non-exemplifiable property of being a round square._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
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